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Abstract
FINANCE AND EMPIRE: ‘GENTLEMANLY CAPITALISM’
IN BRITAIN’S OCCUPATION OF EGYPT
by
Jared Iacolucci

Advisers: Professor Elena Frangakis-Syrett and Professor Simon Davis
Toward the beginning of the nineteenth century, Egypt was being led by Mehmed Ali, a
reformer eager to build his own dynastic state separate from the Ottoman Empire. Despite his
achievements, by the end of the nineteenth century Egypt had been occupied by Great Britain for
nearly two decades. This paper will examine the developments in Egypt and Great Britain that
drew the two together, with particular emphasis on the growth and expansion of international
finance into foreign government lending. As finance became an increasingly profitable career in
Britain, financiers entered the gentlemanly class and socialized with the political elite.
Government policy subsequently reflected the aims of both the political and financial elite under
a newly defined national interest. As the national interest was threatened—by financial crisis in
Egypt and geopolitical threats in Europe—Britain was drawn into more direct involvement with
the purchase of Khedive Ismail’s Suez Canal Company Shares under Prime Minister Disraeli and
the invasion and occupation of Egypt under Prime Minister Gladstone, who were both linked
with financiers and members of the gentlemanly class. Originally intended to be temporary, the
occupation would last 70 years and help institutionalize racial and cultural aspects of British
imperialism.
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Introduction

The nineteenth century was a period of dynamic and dramatic change in Egypt. The turn
of the century saw Ottoman removal of Napoleon’s forces with assistance from Great Britain.
By the end of the century, Egypt had been occupied by Great Britain for almost two decades. In
the interim, a dynasty begun by an Albanian-Ottoman administrator carved an autonomous
province out of the Ottoman Empire, attempted to establish its own empire in the Nile Valley
and the Levant, and developed the institutional and economic foundations of a modern state. In a
century filled with such dramatic political shifts, social changes were no less important.1 This
study, however, is primarily interested in the economic conditions of the Egyptian state, the
penetration of European capital, and the relationship between finance and imperialism.
Although Mehmed Ali and his dynasty achieved considerable autonomy for Egypt, the
territory was still nominally an Ottoman province. The history of Egypt in the nineteenth
century is therefore linked to the history of the Ottoman Empire as a whole; yet changes in
Egypt’s social and economic fabric led to different outcomes. There are similarities that stand
out when the two are examined together: both Cairo and the Porte pursued economic and
political reform in attempts to consolidate power; both utilized foreign loans to finance
development projects; and both accrued massive foreign debt that prompted foreign
intervention.2 These general similarities should not be taken as evidence that the experiences of
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See Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cairo:
American University in Cairo Press, 2002); Ehud Toledano, “Social and Economic Change in the Long Nineteenth
Century,” in The Cambridge History of Egypt, ed. M.W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
2
Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire,
1300-1914, Vol. 2, ed. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 759-943;
Emmanuel Wallerstein, Hale Decdeli, and Resat Kasaba, “The Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the World
Economy,” in The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, ed. Huri Islamogu-Inan (Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 88-97.
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both were identical. Nevertheless, encroaching European financial penetration was, in both
cases, a forerunner for more direct forms of intervention, albeit manifesting in different ways.
European intervention in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt occurred in response to state
bankruptcies during the 1870s brought on by a combination of ineffective financial
administration, a worldwide collapse in commodity prices, and predatory lending by European
financiers. Moreover, both bankruptcies led to bondholder intervention in government affairs.
Yet Egypt would lose control over its own affairs, becoming a “veiled protectorate” of the
British Empire, while the Ottoman Empire was still an independent entity and experienced
relatively minor intervention from the European powers in the form of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration. Was international bondholder intervention in Egypt ineffective enough to
prompt Britain into unilateral action? Why did the British government decide that Egypt was
worthy of direct intervention while the Ottoman Empire merely needed financial guidance?
Why did Great Britain have an interest in Egypt in ways different from the Ottoman Empire as a
whole?
For Great Britain, the most important consideration in the second half of the nineteenth
century was the Eastern Question, or how to approach the threat posed by simultaneous Russian
expansion and Ottoman contraction in the Balkans and Asia. Although Great Britain had sought
to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the face of Russian expansion throughout the
nineteenth century,3 the British government seized control of one of the Porte’s nominal
provinces and finished the process of amputation begun by Mehmed Ali. Britain’s invasion and
occupation of Egypt beginning in 1882 has most often been explained as a measure protecting
the Suez Canal, the waterway opened only thirteen years before and the quickest route from

3

See Milos Kovic, Disraeli and the Eastern Question (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Europe to India.4 Others have ascribed the British occupation to official action by the
government on behalf of the bondholders of Egyptian debt.5 As is often the case, the truth lies
somewhere in the middle.
A recent attempt at finding a middle ground between the various theories of imperialism
identifies a class of gentlemanly capitalists, particularly financiers involved in government loans
and likeminded government officials, as the progenitors and agents of British imperialism.6
Their preference for foreign government bonds over commercial and industrial interests meant
that returns on investment were the focus, not development. Rather than identifying the concern
for imperial security or financial solvency in isolation from one another, this theory explains
imperial action as a result of the confluence of the elite constituencies in contemporary British
policy. Applied to Egypt, the theory is successful in showing that one does not need to give
precedence to either strategic or financial goals since the two are completely entwined. The
British government’s purchase of Khedive Ismail’s shares of the Suez Canal Company is an
informative representation of gentlemanly capitalism at work. The Suez Canal was undoubtedly
a strategic and economic asset to Great Britain as a means of protecting and trading with India;
by purchasing the Khedive’s shares, Britain had gained a financial asset (and potential liability)
as well.
In simple terms, this theory of imperialism describes a “gentlemanly elite who promoted
and served capitalist interests” both at home and abroad.7 Who comprised the gentlemanly elite
and were they active in Egypt? What is the precipitate combination of interest and action by
4

See Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1908); Robert Tignor, Modernization and
British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Ronald Robinson and John
Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: the Climax of Imperialism (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1968).
5
J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: a Study (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005).
6
P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688-2000 (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2002).
7
Ibid., 9.
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financiers, merchants, manufacturers, and politicians in British imperialism in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century? In order to answer these questions, the next section will provide a brief
historical survey of the development and expansion of British industry and overseas commerce
and finance in Ottoman domains. This section will also examine the changing social fabric of
Great Britain in the nineteenth century which allowed for a new class of gentlemen to emerge
before turning to specific examples of gentlemanly capitalists.
After examining developments in Great Britain, economic and political developments in
Egypt during the nineteenth century will be analyzed. Particular focus will be placed on the
development of a state monopoly system for funding state-building projects and the dismantling
of that system within several decades. Why did the state monopoly system fail? Who benefitted
from liberalized trade in Egypt? What unforeseen consequences did trade liberalization have for
the Egyptian state? As noted above, Egyptian financial insolvency occurred at the same time as
Ottoman bankruptcy and therefore some comparisons must be made between the two cases.
The final section will examine the rapid changes in Anglo-Egyptian relations from 18751885. Over the course of this decade Egypt lost its stake in the Suez Canal Company, lost
control of its finances, and, ultimately, lost its autonomy. Meanwhile, the British government
purchased a stake in a private company to whose founding it had originally been opposed,
pressured the Porte to depose the sometimes rigid Khedive Ismail, and, eventually, invaded and
occupied Egypt. Herein lies the main question: why did Great Britain invade and occupy Egypt?
Instead of relying on a single primary motive—whether financial, commercial, or strategic—this
analysis will show that these motives were interrelated and formed an interest that originated
with and was advanced by gentlemanly capitalists in Great Britain, before finally being
institutionalized by their contemporary elites in politics and the state bureaucracy. The

4

occupation of Egypt is only one manifestation of this interest; international cooperation in the
Ottoman PDA was another. Although the British imperial ruling castes were not identical in
social or occupational character, finance capitalism was a unifying interest out of which late
nineteenth century imperialism grew. Foreign policy in general and the occupation in particular
were not motivated by a desire to protect bondholder interests; however, bondholder interests
were identical to strategic interests because they were crafted within the framework of
gentlemanly capitalism.

5

Chapter 1 - The 19th Century: Empire, Free Trade, and Finance

Nineteenth century Britain, like contemporary Egypt, underwent extensive political,
economic, and social change. Of particular interest to this study is the way in which a dynamic
economic system affected change in the social and political life in Great Britain and how those
changes manifested themselves in state policy. The rise of a new financial and political order
was accompanied by an alignment of financial and political interests into one national interest as
defined by gentlemanly capitalists. This alignment is evidenced by the state’s responses to
domestic economic crises and its diplomacy, particularly in regions outside of direct British
control.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 ushered in a new financial system in which the
government could accumulate debt in large amounts.8 The somewhat easy and reliable flow of
capital to the state was encouraged by landowners’—and later, bankers’—investments in
government debt, which gave them a financial stake in the well-being of the political system.
The potential for these moneyed men to corrupt politics in pursuit of their own interest was
something to which seventeenth and eighteenth century commentators alluded frequently.
According to Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, “great companies [were] created, the
pretended servants, but in many respects the real masters of every administration.”9 While there
may have been some truth to that statement around the turn of the eighteenth century,

8

P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), 6-12.
9
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Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, iii (1749) quoted in Dickson, Financial Revolution, 18.
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corporations like the East India Company and the Bank of England were discredited as
bondholders by the time Bolingbroke was writing.10
In the early nineteenth century, financiers were busy investing in railways and issuing
foreign loans while the traditional agricultural sector of the economy was about to experience
long-term contraction. The landowning aristocracy saw a marked decline in their economic
preeminence following the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 during the government of Sir Robert
Peel.11 William Gladstone, future Prime Minister during the invasion and occupation of Egypt
and free trade enthusiast, had begun his career in Parliament fourteen years earlier and was a
protégé to Sir Robert Peel.12 Unlike the free trade Peelites, future Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli was in favor of the protectionist Corn Laws and continued to support tariffs that would
benefit the traditional landowning elite.13 Later in their careers, the two statesmen would quarrel
over the course of action taken in Egypt, a result of free trade and the creation of conditions
where political intervention became necessary.14
The free trade movement beginning in the 1840s altered the domestic economic reality in
Great Britain in favor of commercial and financial interests. Even before the Corn Laws had
been repealed a policy of encouraging free trade agreements with foreign governments was
already in place. For instance, the Treaty of Balta Liman of 1838 and the Treaty of London in
1840, negotiated with the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, established free trade agreements that
created new markets for British manufactured goods.15 Other agreements were made with Persia

10

E.L. Hargreaves, The National Debt (1933. Reprint, Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966), 10-11.
Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 67.
12
Roy Jenkins, Gladstone: A Biography (New York: Random House, 1995), 28-50.
13
P.R. Ghosh, “Disraelian Conservatism: A Financial Approach,” The English History Review 99, no. 391 (Apr.
1984): 268-280, accessed October 17, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/568981.
14
See John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review, New
Series 6, no. 1 (1953).
15
Ahmed Abdel Rahim Mustafa, “The Breakdown of the Monopoly System in Egypt after the 1840s,” in Political
and Social Change in Modern Egypt, ed. Peter Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 292-294.
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in 1836 and Japan in 1858. In China, the inability to open and liberalize trade led to the Opium
Wars of 1840 and 1857.16 The government was clearly willing to authorize state power either
through international treaty agreements or military action in pursuit of economic goals in the
middle of the nineteenth century. What form state action took depended on the circumstances
and was certainly open for debate.
Exporting manufactured goods and importing raw materials was undoubtedly one of the
main goals of Victorian politicians. Commercial and industrial ventures required capital from
investors, a role which was originally filled by the landowning aristocracy and later by industrial
financiers. The investments and debts of the aristocracy came to be managed increasingly by
bankers in the nineteenth century while the revenues from the agricultural economy
simultaneously decreased. These dual processes encouraged the entanglement of the landed elite
and bankers in an ever-expanding web of financial necessity spun as far back as 1694.17 The
financial dependency of the one class and the rising wealth of the other allowed for more social
interaction and intermingling, bringing bankers into the gentlemanly fold. In this socially mobile
environment, Lionel Rothschild’s financial patronage of Disraeli during his early career as a
novelist and his willingness to give assistance to a debt-riddled Disraeli in 1848 helped establish
a friendship which lasted through their lives.18 As Jews, both men were outside the landed
establishment and both sought respectability within society. This interdependency needs to be
expanded upon further for it is the basis of the theory of gentlemanly capitalist agency in British
imperialism.

16

Gallagher and Robinson, “Imperialism,” 10-11.
Dickson, Financial Revolution, 17.
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Before 1850, landowning peers dominated the political landscape of Great Britain, which
enabled them to maintain a preeminent position in economic and social life as well.19 Indeed, on
the surface, the political status quo did not seem to change much following 1850; the small
number of available positions in upper-level administration was open chiefly to those with
private means and elite connections. Some offices, like the Foreign Office, were dominated by
peers until as late as 1914. Similarly, the nineteenth century as a whole had more Prime
Ministers from the House of Lords than from the House of Commons, despite the democratizing
nature of the 1832 and 1867 Reform Acts.20 Therefore, it is not surprising that increasing profits
and fortunes drove bankers and merchants to seek entrance into the gentlemanly class, from
which they had previously been excluded due to their backgrounds and where they could mingle
with the aristocracy and influence state policy.
Several characteristics distinguished the English gentleman of the nineteenth century.
Most important of all, a gentleman needed a proper education. The landowning elite sent their
children to public schools like Eton and then on to Oxford or Cambridge.21 Therefore, if a
banking family like the Rothschilds or Goschens—already somewhat marginalized as Jews or
foreigners22—or a wealthy merchant family like that of John Gladstone wanted their sons to
become English gentlemen, an elite education was a necessity.23 For the Rothschilds, attending
these institutions had little bearing on their future careers since they were likely to be recruited
into the family firm. Nathaniel Rothschild, the leading partner of the London branch of the bank

19

Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 67.
D.C.M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1968), x-xx.
21
Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 38-45,
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Thomas J. Spinner, George Joachim Goschen: The Transformation of a Victorian Liberal (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1973).
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Ferguson, Rothschild, 225-226; Jenkins, Gladstone, 9-25.
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following his father’s death in 1879, attended Cambridge but did not achieve a degree.24 George
Goschen was schooled at Rugby before seeking a scholarship at Trinity.25 Although the four
Gladstone boys all attended respectable schools, William was the only one to achieve any high
academic honors.26
Superficially, the failure of Nathaniel Rothschild and William Gladstone’s brothers to
realize academic success may seem a waste of money. However, public school and university
were, in a sense, elite social clubs wherein future gentleman could be allowed to intermingle and
exchange ideas. For Nathaniel Rothschild, enrollment at Trinity College afforded him the
opportunity to forge a friendship with the Prince of Wales.27 After leaving Trinity, Nathaniel
successfully pursued a seat in the House of Commons.28 Goschen found employment with
Frühling and Goschen, his family’s firm, and began his career in Parliament in 1859.29
Similarly, the Gladstone boys’ enrollment in elite schools preceded stints in Parliament for
each.30 Regardless of one’s success in public school, enrollment alone, if backed by socially
enabling private means, seems to have provided the sons of bankers and merchants with a door
into the Houses of Parliament.
Another characteristic of the English gentleman in the nineteenth century was the
leisurely nature of their occupation. An English gentleman was expected to be removed from
direct contact with the means of production and labor.31 Additionally, the free time afforded to a
gentleman enabled him to pursue sport and study the arts of administration and leadership.32

24

Ferguson, Rothschild, 226.
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Banking partners and financiers had both the time and money to pursue a gentlemanly life. After
making a fortune in the Anglo-American trade, John Gladstone retired to a life of foreign
investment.33 The London Rothschilds were known to take short work days, sought membership
in the popular social clubs of London, and purchased country estates, another signifier of the
gentleman.34 Moreover, the Rothschilds and Goschens were primarily interested in lending to
foreign governments, not commerce or industry. They were therefore focused on returns, not
development. Generally speaking, wealthy bankers and merchants had worked their way into the
social world of the English gentleman by the second half of the nineteenth century.
As D.C.M. Platt has thoughtfully pointed out, “what record is likely to survive of an
informal contact over a club bar, or of a conversation at dinner in a country house?”35
Nevertheless, there need not be records for an observer to see an alignment of interests. The
theory of gentlemanly capitalism posits that “it is impossible to separate the world of
‘acceptable’ business from that of elite politicians and from their perceptions of national
interest.”36 In other words, the fraternizing of moneyed men and politicians in the social world is
representative of the alignment of their interests. Put simply, as the two groups intermingled and
intermarried, so too did their interests. Although disputes might have arisen over the particular
course of action to take in a political or economic crisis, they were debated by members of the
gentlemanly capitalist elite whose shared goals comprised the national interest.37
Domestically, the gentlemanly capitalist elite were particularly instrumental in two
economic crises in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The so-called bimetallism
controversy in the 1880s and 1890s was, in essence, a debate over the validity of the gold
33

Jenkins, Gladstone, 4-5.
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35
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standard. While some economists supported the abandonment of the gold standard most City
bankers—including Goschen38—supported its continuation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
chose to uphold the gold standard, a reflection of the shared understanding of national economic
interest between bankers and government.39 Similarly, the Baring Crisis, in which the Baring
Brothers had underwritten loans to Argentina without sufficient liquidity, also precipitated
government action. This crisis differed from the financial crisis of the 1860s in which the
finance house Overend, Gurney, and Company was allowed to fail. Unlike 1866, the Baring
Crisis of 1890 was resolved by swift action by the Bank of England, the Exchequer, and several
private banks to establish a fund that would guarantee Barings’ solvency.40 This nineteenth
century case of “too big to fail” exemplified the seamless interaction between government and
finance by gentlemanly capitalists.
Foreign bondholders, for their part, were happy to let a form of laissez-faire investment
capitalism reign, as long as there was stability for their investments.41 In cases where instability
threatened the financial and commercial order, there was discussion about the proper course to
take. In South America, the proper course was to remain unofficially involved and protect
Anglo-American relations that were underlined by tacit approval of the Monroe Doctrine.
Although investments in South America were large, excessive state intervention there may have
disrupted the flow of investment to the United States.42 Therefore, when bondholders needed
representation in the new South American republics, they relied on consuls to act in an unofficial
capacity to represent them.43
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In Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, other circumstances dictated the exact course to be
taken in order to insure the national interest. The British perception of Ottoman decline placed
the region now called the Middle East in the forefront of strategic thought. Ottoman territory
provided a buffer against Russian advances in Asia and the Balkans that might threaten the
security of British India. British strategy toward the Eastern Question required the preservation
of the Ottoman Empire. During the Crimean War, the Rothschilds furnished the Porte’s first
foreign loan, guaranteed by both the British and French governments.44 That guarantee meant
that the British government was bound to insure interest payments to the bondholders, out of its
own pockets if necessary.45 In return for a guarantee on the loan, the British government
retained the right to appoint representatives for oversight into the loan’s deployment.46 Although
that right was not exercised, these terms established the norms for state intervention on behalf of
bondholders in other cases. In both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, internal and external
developments during the nineteenth century created different contexts for the protection of
European interests.
Of particular interest for this study are the events that followed Mehmed Ali’s
assumption of power and the effects that programs of consolidation and centralization had on
Egypt as a whole. The nineteenth century in Egypt can be roughly divided into three separate
eras: the era of centralization and expansion through monopolies which lasted until 1840; the era
of free trade and development through state borrowing lasting until 1875; and the period of direct
European involvement in state affairs ultimately defined by the invasion and occupation by Great
Britain and subsequent administration under Evelyn Baring.
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Mehmed Ali was an Albanian Ottoman army officer intent on establishing his own
dynastic state; therefore, despite the claims of Egyptian nationalist historians, Ali should not be
considered the father of modern Egyptian nationhood, although his reforms would give rise to it
circumstantially. Accordingly, to some degree Colonel ‘Urabi’s attempted nationalist revolution
in 1882 can trace its roots to the military system founded and expanded by Mehmed Ali. The
creation of an Egyptian army relied entirely on conscription of the peasantry, who were often
unwilling to fight in wars of conquest, and enslavement in the Sudan.47 By developing his own
military strength, Ali consolidated his power in the international arena; domestically, he removed
Mamluks from power, violently, and co-opted other elites.48
In order to fund an increasingly large military, economic reform was a necessity. When
Mehmed Ali assumed power in 1805, the Egyptian economy was largely agricultural and such
industry that existed had not been exposed to mass-mechanized means of production.49 In the
agricultural sector, the practice of tax-farming, in which a multazim would acquire land from the
state and collect taxes from the peasantry while utilizing his own tax-free portion, was phased
out during Ali’s early reign. If a multazim was unable to collect the taxes assigned to him, the
corresponding land was confiscated by the state and redistributed to a member of Ali’s network.
This process of reallocating land was complemented by official cadastral surveys and the levying
of uniform and direct taxes. Moreover, the residents of land now under direct taxation by the
state were simultaneously forced to grow certain crops that Mehmed Ali wished to export. In

47
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this way, Ali created state monopolies in the agricultural sector and realized increases in
revenue.50
Additionally, Ali attempted to develop a domestic industrial sector to relieve Egypt of its
reliance on imported goods. Factories were built not only for the production of goods such as
textiles and glass, but also to produce the complex machinery needed for industrial growth.51 Ali
hoped that these government-owned factories would produce goods for both domestic
consumption and external trade. Numerous attempts were made to protect new industries by
encouraging Egyptians to buy Egyptian goods; however, these protectionist policies were
waylaid by Ottoman control of customs duties and eventually dissolved by international treaty
toward the end of Ali’s reign.52 Despite difficulties, these economic reforms were able to create
industrial and agricultural monopolies that funded a new Egyptian army.
The army allowed Mehmed Ali to invade the Levant and challenge the authority of the
Porte over Egypt and greater Syria. The campaign to re-conquer Mecca and Medina from the
Wahabis at the Porte’s urging in 1813 gave Mehmed Ali’s oldest son, Ibrahim, the title of
governor of the Hijaz. The expanding Egyptian empire now had control over the Red Sea
trade.53 Similarly, the Porte requested Ali’s assistance in the unsuccessful campaign against the
Greek independence movement. Following defeat in Greece, Ibrahim invaded and occupied
Ottoman Syria where he was established as governor of the province under the Porte’s decree.54
Mehmed Ali’s wars of conquest had expanded the territory under his control to cover Egypt, the
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Sudan, the Hijaz, and Syria by 1833. This proto-empire was to be short-lived; Egypt’s expansion
threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain would soon intervene.
In 1838, the Sublime Porte signed an agreement with Great Britain—the Treaty of Balta
Liman—which dissolved monopolies within the Ottoman Empire while granting British
merchants the right to purchase and sell goods subject to a relatively favorable three percent
tariff.55 The Porte agreed to the terms hoping that it would limit Mehmed Ali’s growing power
by forcing him into direct conflict with Great Britain.56 Ali’s refusal of the terms did lead to a
confrontation with Britain; in the summer of 1840 Anglo-Turkish troops landed in Beirut and
helped incite a rebellion against Egyptian rule throughout Syria.57 Forced from Syria, Mehmed
Ali consented to the terms of the Treaty of London (1840), which reiterated the commercial
agreement of Balta Liman, forced Egypt to remove its claim over the Holy Cities, and drastically
limited his military capabilities. In accepting the terms, Mehmed Ali received a concession that
granted hereditary rule over Egypt and Sudan with the succession going to his oldest male
relative.58 This was a watershed moment for Egypt in several respects: first, the military
capabilities of Egypt were severely limited; second, the family of Mehmed Ali was guaranteed
succession but remained bound to the Sublime Porte; and third, industrial and commercial
reforms were undone, restricting the state’s ability to produce revenue through monopolization
and forcing the government to look abroad to finance public projects.
Mehmed Ali would continue to rule Egypt as Viceroy until 1848 when he was replaced
by his son, Ibrahim, due to illness. Ibrahim died shortly after assuming power and was in turn
replaced by his nephew, Abbas. Under Abbas, Egypt’s military capabilities were reduced as
55
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dictated by the terms of the Treaty of London and to help economize the state’s expenditures.59
Abbas also authorized the construction of a railway between Alexandria and Cairo at the urging
of Britain’s consul-general and several directors of the British Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company. The railway was built using supplies purchased in Britain under the
direction of British engineers, but with Egyptian capital and labor.60 British capitalists flocked to
Egypt and British influence in Egypt would be ascendant until Abbas’s death later that year.61
Importantly, these British capitalists were involved directly in the development of infrastructure
and therefore had an interest in the actualization of projects, unlike later financiers issuing
government loans.
Under Said, Egypt turned toward France for foreign development. The Viceroy
developed a personal relationship with Ferdinand de Lesseps through which a concession was
given for the construction of the Suez Canal.62 Despite British opposition to the canal scheme—
due to commercial and financial interests in Egyptian railways and fear of French dominance in
Egypt—the Suez Canal Company was formed and in 1858 issued 400,000 shares of stock for
public purchase. Over 200,000 were bought in France while Said purchased 64,000. Shares
were set aside for British subscribers but there was no initial investment. In 1860, over one
quarter of the original shares were still unsubscribed and Said was induced to purchase them.63
Egypt did not have the capital to finance these additional shares and the Viceroy turned to
financiers in France for a loan in September of 1860.64 This would be the first in a series of
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loans with extremely unfavorable terms that Egypt would contract over the following decade and
a half.
British reluctance to subscribe to the Suez Canal project reveals an interesting dimension
of gentlemanly capitalism. Capitalists with an adventuresome spirit were willing to back British
projects like the Nile Navigation Company. Funded mainly by British capital, the company
collapsed in the early 1860s and Said directed the Egyptian Treasury to purchase the company’s
shares at a large cost.65 However, the City’s financial houses, including aspiring gentlemanly
capitalists like the Rothschilds and Goschens, were much less willing to be involved in staple
industrial and commercial ventures as such, preferring government loans with high interest rates.
Under such principles, Suez Canal shares did not seem to offer attractive returns. Nevertheless,
as borrowing accelerated under Said and Ismail, financiers in Britain were increasingly involved
in Egyptian government loans which were channeled into development projects by the recipient
state.
From 1863-1873, Ismail, Abbas’ successor, undertook seven foreign loans worth 69
million pounds sterling at an average interest rate of 10%. Of the nominal total, Egypt actually
received 46 million. A large portion of the sums received went directly to servicing Egypt’s
debt.66 A small percentage of Egypt’s expenditure went to the Porte in the form of tribute, which
was doubled in 1867 in exchange for succession by primogeniture and official recognition as
Khedive. The remainder was used on internal development. Ismail expanded irrigation to
encourage cotton cultivation, which had become extremely profitable thanks to reduced
American production during the Civil War; the harbor in Alexandria was deepened and widened;
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roads were paved; and bridges were built. While some of the projects were undoubtedly
beneficial, others—such as palace-building—drained Ismail’s finances unnecessarily.67
Egypt was not alone in its growing dependence on European finance. In the 1860s,
bankers and financiers flocked to Istanbul as well as Alexandria, either to establish
correspondent offices for their European banks or to act as mediators for loans.68 In Egypt,
British capital helped establish the Anglo-Egyptian Bank and continental bankers like
Oppenheim, Chambert, and Company lent and managed capital for private and public
investors.69 In the Ottoman Empire, the Imperial Ottoman Bank acted locally on behalf of its
British and French backers.70 Like Khedive Ismail, Sultan Abdul Aziz spent borrowed-money
enthusiastically for development projects which served the underlying aim of centralizing state
authority.71 That spending in Cairo and Istanbul was out of control is clear; however, European
financiers were no less at fault for facilitating bankruptcies through recklessly exploitative
lending practices.
Ismail developed a close working relationship with Eduard Dervieu, a French financier,
who acted as a personal banker and unofficial adviser to the Khedive during his reign. Thanks to
connections with both the Khedive and European financiers, Dervieu’s career was made by
encouraging the two sides to do business with one another.72 Although there does not appear to
have been a similar figure in the contemporary Ottoman financial realm, bankers were certainly
encouraging the Porte’s borrowing and may have been able to destroy the political careers of
Ottoman ministers who refused to accept loans.73 Generally speaking, the unfavorable terms of
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Ottoman and Egyptian bonds meant investors had a high profit potential. Conversely, Egypt and
the Ottoman Empire were not receiving the full amount of subscribed capital and were still
obligated to return the nominal value with interest.
For both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, increasing integration into a European
dominated global economy precipitated foreign indebtedness. In both cases, ostentatious
spending encouraged by predatory lending led to massive indebtedness by 1875: in Egypt the
debt was approximately ninety million pounds sterling while in the Ottoman Empire the debt was
over two hundred million.74 Although the policies that had led Cairo and Istanbul to this point
were in some respects identical, the routes taken after 1875 were different. Between 1875 and
1881—particularly following the Berlin Congress in 1878—the Porte negotiated with
representatives of European bondholders and the Powers. The Decree of Mouharrem in 1881
established the PDA as a body to manage Ottoman finances.75 Despite the creation of a similar
body in Egypt in 1876, stability was not achieved and by late 1882 Egypt had been invaded and
occupied by Britain.
The emergence of Germany as a mediator in resolving the Russo-Ottoman crisis of 18771878 signaled a turn in Britain’s ability to influence the Ottoman Empire. As the Porte looked
increasingly to Germany and built a relationship that would last until World War I, Britain had
already embarked on a transformed relationship with Egypt that would deepen in the decade to
come. Both British bondholders and the British government found themselves heavily invested
in the financial well-being of Egypt; with the purchase of the Khedive’s Suez Canal shares, the
British government became a bondholder by another name.
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Chapter 2 - Government Bonds and Imperial Occupation

When the program of foreign borrowing began, Egypt was experiencing a boom in cotton
prices thanks to disruption of cotton production in the United States during the Civil War. By
1870, American cotton production had revived and the 1873 global financial crisis depressed
commodity prices, further hampering Egypt’s ability to meet its obligations.76 In 1873 over half
of Egypt’s funded debt was owned by British bondholders.77 Frühling and Goschen alone had
issued over ten million pounds between 1862 and 1866, all in London. Moreover, if a loan was
extended by a body such as the Anglo-Egyptian Bank or the Imperial Ottoman Bank, a majority
of its shares were issued in London.78 It is important to recognize that these were not held by the
British government but by independent bondholders who were represented by the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders, a body composed of British financiers that extended credit to foreign
governments.79 Nonetheless, in 1878 at least four MPs sat in the Council, including both Deputy
Chairmen.80 These four MPs represent the overlap between private and state interests in
gentlemanly capitalism.
Egypt’s financial situation in 1875 was dire. Ismail needed a loan desperately in order to
meet his debt obligations, but Egypt’s existing external debt and yearly budget deficits had
destroyed the state’s credit.81 Unable to negotiate a new loan, the Khedive began to market his
Suez Canal Company shares to raise the necessary capital. Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary,
informed the consul-general in Egypt, General Stanton, that he had “received information that a
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combination of French capitalists [were] offering to buy from the Khedive his interest in the
Suez Canal.”82 Stanton confirmed the offer and noted that Derby’s subsequent offer for the
British government to purchase the shares was well received.83 According to Derby, “it [was] of
great importance that the Viceroy’s interest in the Suez Canal should not fall into the hands of a
foreign company,” a view reiterated by Prime Minister Disraeli during the first session of
Parliament in 1876.84 Derby authorized Stanton to negotiate a transaction in which Great Britain
would purchase the Khedive’s shares for approximately four million pounds sterling.85
Since Parliament was not in session and the Bank of England was not able to act as the
financial instrument of the British Government, the Rothschilds were approached. The
agreement proposed by the Rothschilds offered to purchase the shares at four million pounds
sterling in installments with a commission of two and one half percent. Also, the Rothschilds
would receive the five percent interest on the shares—a replacement for the shares’ mortgaged
dividends—due to the British government until the total amount had been repaid. As security
against this “heavy liability”, the Rothschilds wanted written confirmation that the government
would “endeavour to obtain the necessary powers to enable them to repay the advance, and pay
Messrs. Rothschild’s commission as soon as may be practicable.”86 The transaction was not a
loan in the strictest sense; rather, as Disraeli described it, the government asked “will you
purchase these shares on our engagement that we will ask the House of Commons to take them
off your hands?”87 As understood by the Rothschilds, both the commission and interest would
be charged to and paid by the British government, a bridging loan by another name.88 Either
82
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way, according to both the Rothschilds and Disraeli this transaction posed a great risk. However,
it seems that if the government refused to “take them off their hands,” the Rothschilds would
have been owners of nearly half the Suez Canal Company with guaranteed interest payments of
two hundred thousand pounds due annually, hardly a “great risk.”89
Two questions regarding this transaction stand out. First, why was the British
government so concerned about the Suez shares falling into the hands of a foreign company?
Second, what does the cooperation between the government and the Rothschilds reveal about
gentlemanly capitalism? In response to the first, only two years before this transaction a dispute
between the Suez Canal Company and the British government had arisen over tonnage duties.
Essentially, the dispute concerned the way in which net tonnage was measured and charged. It
was settled by a commission in Istanbul, but de Lesseps, unhappy with the terms of the
agreement, threatened to close the Canal. A force of ten thousand Egyptian soldiers was
deployed under the command of a British officer to seize control should de Lesseps proceed.
Sufficiently threatened, de Lesseps backed down and agreed to the settlement.90 For Disraeli,
threats to close the Canal to British ships were proof that one company’s control of the Canal
was dangerous to British commercial and strategic interests.91 Therefore, British government
ownership was perhaps the best way to safeguard the Canal and its commercial and strategic
significance.92
This leads directly into the second question. The government did not have four million
pounds lying dormant in the Treasury and since the Bank of England could only be petitioned
through Parliament, a private banker was needed. According to Disraeli, “the Bank of England
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would no more have advanced £4,000,000 for the purchase of these shares, and taken the
responsibility of holding them upon themselves, than they would have paid off the National
Debt.”93 Thankfully, he was a close friend of Baron Rothschild and was therefore quick to
contact the Baron regarding the potential purchase.94 The transaction would not have happened
had Disraeli not been adamant about it. Indeed, in a letter to the Queen on November 18th,
Disraeli expressed that “it is vital to your Majesty’s authority and power at this critical moment,
that the Canal should belong to England, and I was so decided and absolute with Lord Derby on
this head, that he ultimately adopted my views.”95
There was no shortage of disagreement in Parliament regarding the purchase. Gladstone
recognized that a commitment to purchase the shares had been made and it would be
irresponsible to renege on funding. However, in paying two and one half percent commission
with five percent interest for an advance that was to last only a few months, the actual per annum
interest rate was around fifteen percent. Additionally, since the Khedive had mortgaged the
dividends to his shares and forfeited his rights to act as a Director, the British government would
receive no representation on the board. Gladstone noted “that the government [was] not aware of
the limited extent of voting power attached to those shares.”96 The lack of awareness is
ignorance at best: without voting power how could the government possibly hope to guarantee
the security of communication and transportation through the Canal? Consultations between
Colonel Stokes and de Lesseps would later produce an agreement whereby three Englishmen
would be granted seats on the Company’s board and Britain would not be deprived of its voting
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rights.97 Nevertheless, the quick action taken by the government to purchase shares without first
undertaking to negotiate for voting rights betrays the notion that the purchase held purely
strategic goals as a priority.
Interestingly, Sir Stafford Northcote, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, admitted that “we
knew that we were taking a step outside of strict law” by engaging the Rothschilds in this
transaction.98 Indeed, they had broken with norms of governmental action developed over the
course of a century. However, since the Suez Canal was, by its very nature, an unparalleled
engineering feat, “the conduct of the Government could not be precisely in accordance with any
precedent.”99 Therefore, while the actions of the state may have seemed undesirable in February,
they were deemed necessary in November. Since the state alone was unable to fund the
protection of the British national interest, as defined above, with sufficient haste, they turned to a
private firm. The Rothschilds willingness to participate in the scheme reveals two things: a
linkage between state interests and potential financial gains; and the ability of an outsider firm
like the Rothschilds to align itself with the establishment. Even more importantly, the purchase
gave the British government a financial stake in a private company operating on foreign soil and
in the Egyptian government’s ability to pay its obligations.
It must be noted that within two years of the Canal’s opening, the Khedive had already
expressed an interest in selling his shares to a British company.100 At that time, the Board of
Trade understood that British ownership of the Canal would be extremely beneficial for
commercial purposes. However, the Canal would need substantial oversight and the British
government “would then be responsible for the acts of a body over which they would have no
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substantial control, and might be placed in a very embarrassing relation to foreign
Governments.”101 The first government of the Liberal Gladstone (1868-1874) was fully aware of
the potential for conflict that would arise from involvement in the affairs of the Suez Canal
Company long before his Conservative successor’s government made the purchase. The
transaction in 1875 should therefore be seen as the fulfillment of the Khedive’s ultimate goal of
selling his shares to reach financial solvency. Under Gladstone, the British government had no
interest in purchasing the shares or encouraging a private firm to do so. Under Disraeli, the
threat of total French control of the Canal to British interests was enough to induce the
government to act.
While the Khedive looked for buyers, he also asked for British assistance in Egypt’s
financial affairs. On October 20, 1875, the Khedive requested the assistance of a “competent
Government official…to assist his Minister of Finance in remedying the confusion which His
Highness admitted existed in the Department of his Administration.”102 Britain appointed Mr.
Cave, the Paymaster-General, to go to Egypt and report on the financial situation.103 Cave’s
report outlined the total revenue and expenditure expected in the future and noted that “if the
gravity of the situation is explained to the bondholders they will consent to an arrangement for
securing to them a fair return on their loans.”104 Since the sale of the Suez shares had done little
to improve Egypt’s finances, the Caisse de la Dette, an international commission, was
established with the goal of representing bondholder interests.105 The system of Dual Control in
which one French and one British controller-general were to manage revenue and expenditure
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was established simultaneously.106 Evelyn Baring, the youngest son of the Baring banking
family, was given the task of representing Britain. Although not directly affiliated with the bank,
Baring did correspond regularly with his brothers and had connections with other City firms.107
Great Britain thus found itself acting in a semi-official capacity through an agent approved by
the government to guard bondholder interests.
The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, acting through banker and MP for the City of
London George Goschen, also participated in the adjustment and consolidation of the Egyptian
debt. Before leaving for Egypt, Goschen had asked the Foreign Office to “point out to the
Government of the Khedive how unfairly the holders of the bonds of these loans had been dealt
with.”108 Goschen asked for assistance knowing that British bondholders held over half of the
nominal total of Egyptian debt in 1876.109 Upon being informed of Goschen’s mission, Derby
instructed the consul in Alexandria to “give such unofficial assistance as you can,” adding that
“Mr. Goschen was a member of the late Cabinet, and is a person of high position and reputation
in this country.”110 The irony of officially instructing an officer to act unofficially
notwithstanding, Goschen used his status as an MP to gain leverage in negotiation regarding his
own financial interest in Egypt.111 Moreover, Goschen was praised by the Council for his efforts
in providing an adequate adjustment of the Egyptian loans during autumn 1876.112 Northcote
asserted that while Goschen “received from the English government a certain amount of
support…[he] conducted [his] business entirely on [his] own account.”113 Northcote goes on to
describe how the settlement between the Khedive and the bondholders collapsed due to
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seemingly insufficient revenue and Britain intervened through the consul-general.114 Goschen’s
mission was a perfect manifestation of the gentlemanly capitalist linkage between private finance
and government.
In order to placate bondholders in response to Ismail’s revenue shortage, a loan of eight
and one half million pounds was extended by the Rothschilds to the Egyptian state.115 This loan
transferred the Khedive’s private land to the state as security, a result of negotiations using
Baring as a middleman.116 Revenues from the mortgaged land would be “managed by a
Commission of three, which [would] consist of an Egyptian, a Commissioner nominated by the
English Government, and a commissioner nominated by the French Government,” and would
“remit the proceeds to Messrs. Rothschild.”117 For Great Britain, the Rothschilds could be used
to maintain Egypt’s financial health. For the Rothschilds, the British government represented a
door into an increasingly British Egypt open to more lucrative loans.118 Once again, the interests
of state officials and financiers were aligned in Egypt.
By 1879, conflict between the Caisse de la Dette, the dual-controllers, and the Egyptian
government was nonetheless delaying financial reforms deemed necessary by the European
representatives. As the British controller-general, Evelyn Baring had clashed with Khedive
Ismail over the steps needed to bring about financial solvency since his appointment in 1877.119
Baring felt strongly that “no sacrifice should be demanded from the creditors until every
reasonable sacrifice had been made by the debtors.”120 This statement is particularly noteworthy
since Baring went on to lament the fact that the debt had to be repaid by brutally collecting taxes
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from Egyptian peasants.121 In autumn 1878, the Khedive retained the services of two Europeans
in the government as Finance Minister and Minister of Public Works, “an assurance that he was
engaged upon a serious and honest experiment [in reform].”122 Ismail, however, wished to
pursue his own method of financial reform and proposed an interest rate reduction of one half
percent. Since the European ministers did not agree, Ismail dismissed them.123 Following their
dismissal, Lord Salisbury, then Disraeli’s Foreign Secretary, declared that Britain was committed
to “defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking the arrangements best calculated to secure
the good government and prosperity of the country.”124 Salisbury would later become Prime
Minister—briefly in 1885 and again in 1886—when the British occupation was becoming firmly
entrenched. British interests, of course, were linked implicitly to the maximization of rates of
return for gentlemanly capitalists through sound and austere management of Egyptian finances.
In a revealing letter on June 18, 1879, Salisbury further enunciated his views on the
British position. Since the Khedive’s mismanagement had failed to meet the reforms deemed
necessary, Britain, in concert with France, was predisposed to protect its own interests in Egypt.
Moreover, “the geographical situation of Egypt, as well as the responsibility which the English
government had in the past incurred for the actual conditions under which it exists as a state,
make it impossible for them to leave it to its fate.”125 In other words, since Great Britain had
intervened in Egyptian affairs to protect commercial and financial interests in the past—
including free trade agreements and the purchase of Suez Canal shares—they could not allow
Egypt to shirk its obligations. The responsibility that Britain envisaged for itself, and the
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Khedive’s unwillingness to abdicate, enabled the government, alongside France, to pressure the
Porte to depose Ismail and transfer power to his son, Tawfiq.126 Prior to this moment, Great
Britain had remained somewhat indirect in its action toward Egypt, preferring to influence
Egyptian affairs through financial advisers. With this action, however, Britain established a new
precedent whereby official state power could be used to effect reform in Egypt that would
benefit bondholders while securing British strategic goals.
Britain’s involvement in Ismail’s deposition was not the beginning of a policy of direct
intervention. Gladstone’s second government, which came to power in 1880, was not willing to
commit itself to a more forceful policy towards Egypt. On the contrary, it expressed a strong
desire to remain indirectly interested. In 1881, Lord Granville articulated British policy to Sir
Edward Malet, the British consul-general in Cairo, noting “the policy of Her Majesty’s
Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full
enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan.”127 The
Sultan’s successive firmans had granted Egypt its autonomous status and preserved the
Khedive’s line as successors, creating a state that was stable and beneficial to British interests.
Egypt’s prosperity was important to Britain due to the vast private investment in Egyptian debt
as well as the government’s part-ownership of the Suez Canal. Although Granville was not
calling for any particular involvement in Egypt, he was linking the stake Great Britain had in
Egypt—both financial and strategic—with a supposed concern for the welfare of Egypt itself.
Despite the Liberals’ ideological unwillingness to intervene directly in Egypt, the Conservatives’
position vis-à-vis Ismail’s deposition, like the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, was not
fundamentally liquidated and would lead to even more intervention.
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Almost immediately following Tawfiq’s assumption of power his sovereignty was
threatened from within Egypt. The Chamber of Notables, a semi-constitutional body created by
Ismail in 1866, had been unable to exercise power until Tawfiq’s rule. Beginning in 1881,
however, conflict with the Chamber destabilized the Khedive’s regime.128 Britain and France,
aware of the threat posed to the Khedive and thus their interests, issued a joint note in January
1882 stating their resolve in maintaining the Khedive’s authority. Again, the note stops short of
adopting forceful policy, but “the determination of England and France to afford [the Khedive
and his government] support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with
the course of public affairs in Egypt” does imply a willingness to intervene if necessary. 129 The
resolve of the two powers was to be tested later that year.
The conflict with the Notables continued to escalate throughout the winter and spring of
1882 as Colonel ‘Urabi assumed the leadership of a burgeoning nationalist movement. There is
no doubt that the large number of foreigners employed in the Khedive’s government, particularly
British and French, added to the discontent.130 The Chamber of Notables, aware of the influence
these European advisers had on state policy, demanded that they be given voting rights on the
budget in place of the Council of Ministers. In response, the two controllers-general issued a
note to both Britain and France expressing their fear that the Chamber “was certainly disposed to
eliminate the European element from the administration of the country.”131 Moreover, the
Chamber’s desire to intervene in the state’s finances by voting on the budget was an attempt to
gain voting rights over “all contracts with European functionaries and concessions to
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foreigners.”132 Should the Chamber have succeeded the financial interests of Britain and France
would have been in jeopardy. The conflict between the notables and the Khedive can therefore
be seen as a financial matter in which the Khedive’s government, supported by and supportive of
British and French interests, was challenged. European involvement in Egyptian political affairs
was inevitable as the Khedive was increasingly associated with Europeans.
Importantly, in the winter of 1882 there was no longer any mention of safeguarding the
Suez Canal. Instead, the focus was on preserving the international arrangements made for
settling the Egyptian debt crisis. With that in mind, Britain could not “be indifferent to events
which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and destroy the results of efforts which have been
successfully made during the last few years to improve the condition of the country.”133 The
efforts to which Granville referred were all directed at improving the state of Egypt’s finances.
Disorder in Egypt was a threat to the financial health of Egypt and by extension the financial
security of foreign bondholders. By summer, disorder had reached a climax. On June 11, riots
in Alexandria killed at least forty-nine people, of which three-fourths were European.134 In the
face of claims that ‘Urabi had instigated the riots, Sir Charles Dilke, undersecretary at the
Foreign Office, noted that “the statement that soldiers assisted in the late riot at Alexandria is,
according to all the information we possess, the opposite of the truth.”135 The European consulsgeneral in Egypt decided that a commission of inquiry into the causes of the riot was
unnecessary.136 If there was suspicion that ‘Urabi was indeed responsible for inciting the riot, it
was not substantiated, nor was this a political factor in late-June.
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On June 23, reports that ‘Urabi had nevertheless placed three vessels full of explosives in
the Suez Canal for potential sabotage revived the British government’s latent fear for the future
of its strategic interest in Egypt.137 The construction of earthwork fortifications and gun batteries
in Alexandria alarmed British officials enough to instruct Admiral Seymour, commander of the
British fleet positioned in Alexandria, to demand the cessation of construction. Seymour was
instructed to prevent any attempt to continue construction.138 On July 11, Seymour bombarded
Alexandria, an action that the British government regarded as self-defense.139 On July 29, the
British fleet moved to secure and hold the Suez Canal.140 Britain’s move to secure the Canal was
met with protestation from de Lesseps, who felt that Britain was abrogating its neutrality. The
British directors in the Suez Canal Company noted that the government’s action stemmed from
the assertion “on apparently good grounds that [‘Urabi] intends, as a last resource, to take
measures to injure British trade by blocking the Canal.”141 On August 4, General Wolseley was
sent to Egypt “in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the
Firmans of the Sultan and existing international engagements, to suppress a military revolt in that
country.”142 Wolseley’s expedition landed on the banks of the canal on August 16 and
proceeded to crush ‘Urabi’s army on a march to Tel al-Kabir, where the Egyptian army was
destroyed. On September 15, just over three months after the riot in Alexandria, the British
military occupied Cairo and arrested ‘Urabi.143
Why had Britain proceeded without French cooperation in its invasion of Egypt? The
joint note of January 1882 was a clear example of cooperation with regard to their shared interest
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in Egypt, yet nine months later Britain found itself as the sole occupier. According to the British
Ambassador in France, the French government was unwilling to pursue a joint military action for
two reasons: first, they expected half of their troops would die of illness due to the season; and
second, they believed that ‘Urabi “would lose strength by the lapse of time.”144 Additionally,
France was fearful that involvement in Egypt would prevent it from defending against a German
invasion.145 Britain was forced to act unilaterally after Prime Minster Freycinet’s government
collapsed following disputes over funding an expeditionary force and the French naval units off
Alexandria disengaged. While a small contingent of Ottoman soldiers was present in the
invasion, it was decidedly British.
The decision to invade was primarily concerned with the preservation of the Khedive’s
authority and, secondarily, the protection of the Suez Canal. Preserving the Khedive’s authority
meant preserving the international agreements made regarding the Egyptian debt. Following the
invasion, discussion of the introduction of liberal institutions in Egypt hinged on the ability of
such institutions to fulfill Egypt’s international obligations. According to Lord Dufferin, the
British Ambassador in Istanbul, over the course of 1882 the Chamber of Notables had “refused
to recognize Egypt’s international obligations.”146 As Gladstone understood, the bondholders’
rights rested on these international obligations.147 There existed a very clear connection between
the British government’s desire to preserve the Khedive and his international engagements, and
those international engagements’ importance to bondholders. Regardless of the threat ‘Urabi did
or did not pose to Egyptian stability, the British perceived his actions as contrary to the
international engagements the Khedive had entered and, therefore, to financial interests. The
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reports of anarchy in Egypt served to consolidate British opinion and encourage action on the
grounds of securing the Suez Canal. The perceived threat to the Suez Canal should not be
disregarded; however, throughout the summer of 1882 the primary goal for Great Britain was a
preservation of the status quo in which the Khedive reigned under British tutelage.
Following the invasion, Britain set about reorganizing the Egyptian administration.
Britain chose Sir Evelyn Baring to fill the role of consul-general in Egypt, succeeding Edward
Malet. After serving as controller-general of the Egyptian debt, Baring had served in India
where he helped balance the budget and sought external funding for infrastructural development
from the Rothschilds.148 This was the second time Baring had used his connections to the
Rothschilds and he would approach them for another loan in 1884.149 Baring noted that “there
was only one practicable method by which the Egyptian administration could be reformed: by
placing the government more or less under British guidance.”150 His background as a finance
minister and controller-general gave him the experience needed to reform Egypt’s financial
system and solidify Britain’s paramount position.
Immediately, however, conflict in the Sudan between the Mahdi and Egyptian forces
further extended and entrenched British control in Egypt. The Mahdi was leading a revolt
against Egyptian forces throughout the Sudan and attempting to establish independence in the
wake of Egypt’s defeat and occupation. A British-led expedition sent to quell the uprising ended
in disaster. In reporting the failure of the expedition to Granville, Baring described the Egyptian
government as intransigent and unwilling to cede territory. He noted that the “maladministration
of successive Egyptian governments” was the main cause of the revolt.151 In response, Granville
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gave Baring instructions that would alter the British role significantly. Granville instructed
Baring to make clear that “the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her
Majesty’s Government to insist on the adoption of policy which they recommend, and that it will
be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to
hold their offices.”152 Put simply, any advice given by Baring should be taken as an order and if
an Egyptian minister was unwilling to follow that order, he would be sacked. This marked a
significant change in the policy of Great Britain; not only was the army now occupying Egypt,
but the administration of Egypt was to rely on British staff for direction.
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Conclusion

In addition to the factors already noted, the invasion and occupation of Egypt should be
seen within the context of dialectically oscillating imperialism under Disraeli and Gladstone.
Disraeli’s pro-Ottoman diplomacy during the Russo-Ottoman crisis of 1877-8 was replaced by
Gladstone’s opposition. 153 Coupled with the presence of large amounts of Egyptian bonds in the
City, a situation was created where intervention became necessary. The “veiled protectorate” in
Egypt established in 1882 under the trusteeship of Evelyn Baring was further entrenched under
Lord Salisbury’s government (1886-1890). Unlike Disraeli, who had continued the longstanding support for Ottoman integrity, Gladstone supported a more independent Khedivate in
Egypt, especially after the loss of British influence in Istanbul.154 Additionally, Gladstone had
committed around half of his investment portfolio to Egyptian bonds in the 1870s.155 This can
almost certainly be ruled out as a cause for Gladstone’s invasion, but it reveals how strong the
links between finance and government were. Like Goschen, Gladstone exemplified gentlemanly
capitalism’s combination of finance and government as a circumstantially conditioning factor in
policy consciousness.
The main goal of invasion—preserving the Khedive’s authority and maintaining
international financial agreements—was not easily accomplished. Spurred on by Evelyn
Baring’s autocratic management and his belief that Egyptians were unable to govern themselves
effectively156, Britain was induced to remain despite Gladstone’s desire to withdraw.157 Under
Baring, the notion that Egyptians were a subject race in need of guidance became
153
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institutionalized and would spread to other parts of the British Empire. In the metropolis,
Salisbury, who had made the case for the importance of Egypt in 1879, similarly institutionalized
the necessity of maintaining the empire for the protection of India. Both of these developments,
steeped in imperialist racial and cultural attitudes and geopolitics, had roots in and were
precipitated by the financial management of Egypt. The occupation of Egypt is therefore not
only an example of gentlemanly capitalism at work, it also demonstrates how gentlemanly
capitalism served as the catalyst and as an enduring factor of broader and more complex
imperialist projects, and the “new” culture of empire after 1882.
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